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THE NEED FOR THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
Birch Bayh*
I. Introduction
In March of this year, after almost 50 years of trying, the most crucial
step in the fight to secure equal rights under law for men and for women was
taken: the Congress, by overwhelming majorities, approved the Equal Rights
Amendment and sent it to the states.' In short order, the requisite number of
states will surely ratify the amendment, and the Constitution will have been
altered for only the twenty-seventh time in our Nation's history.'
There was no shortage of controversial issues for the Congress, and now
for the state legislatures, to debate while considering the Equal Rights Amend-
ment. Some persons, though only a few, objected to the principle of equality
under the law for men and women.' More significant was the dispute, some-
times technical and sometimes tedious, about the effect of the amendment in
the form in which it had been presented.' But perhaps the most important and
thoughtful question raised by those who opposed the Equal Rights Amendment
was whether a constitutional amendment was the correct way to strike at the
problem of sex discrimination.' Our Nation's most fundamental document ought
not, it was said, be amended when lesser measures (court decisions, state and
federal legislation) could adequately handle the evil sought to be eradicated.
However, in the particular circumstances of the Equal Rights Amendment, this
argument appears to be inapposite. The long history of adverse court decisions,
the practical difficulties in securing corrective legislation from every state and
from the Congress, the pervasiveness of sex discrimination in our Nation's laws,
and the social, economic and psychological impact of such discrimination, make
a constitutional amendment necessary and proper. In fact, a constitutional
amendment is the only realistic and responsible way to guarantee equal rights
* United States Senator from Indiana; B.S., Purdue University School of Agriculture; J.D.,
Indiana University Law School.
1 H.R.J. Res. 208, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The House of Representatives approved
the Amendment 354 to 23 on October 12, 1971. The Senate approved it on March 22, 1972,
by a vote of 84 to 8.
2 As of July 10, 1972, twenty states have ratified the Equal Rights Amendment: Alaska,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mich-
igan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, West
Virginia, Wisconsin. Eighteen more states must approve the proposed amendment for it to
become part of the Constitution.
3 See, e.g., letter from Mrs. J. T. Grace to Congressman Don Edwards, March 3, 1971, in
Hearings on H. R. Res. 35 and 208 Before Subcomm.' No. 4 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. at 602 (1971); Reitzer, What the Bible Reveals About
Women's Role and Rights, id. at 572.
4 See, e.g., 118 CONG. RECORD S. 4543-4551 (daily ed. March 22, 1972) (debate between
Senator Bayh and Senator Ervin concerning the effect of the Equal Rights Amendment on
privacy and sexual offenses); Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendments: Some Problems of Con-
struction, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGssTS-Civ. Lim. L. REv. 243 (1971).
5 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 689, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess. 29-30 (1972) (Minority Views of Mr.
Ervin); Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 HARv. CIV. RGHTS-
Civ. LiB. L. REv. 234 (1971); Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment, supra note 4, at 243.
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for men and women. The purpose of this article is to explain the reasons for
this conclusion in greater detail.
II. Some General Principles
It seems useful first to lay out some of the general principles on which the
Equal Rights Amendment is based. The operative part of the amendment is
straightforward: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." Basic prin-
ciples about the meaning of this section have been repeatedly explored in and
out of Congress and are fairly well known."
First, the amendment recognizes the fundamental dignity and individuality
of each human being by'declaring that sex should not be a factor in determining
the legal rights of men or of women. Put another way, the amendment will
require that the federal government, and all state and local governments and
branches thereof treat each person, man or woman, on the basis of relevant
individual characteristics, such as mental or physical ability, and not on the basis
of the legally irrelevant characteristic of sex. From this it follows that the amend-
ment does not require any level of government to establish quotas for men and
women in any of its activities; rather, the amendment will simply require equal
treatment of equal individuals, regardless of sex.
Second, and really a corollary of the first point, the amendment does not
require identical treatment of men and women when, because of unique physical
characteristics, such treatment is impossible. Thus, a law which bases legal con-
sequences on a physical characteristic unique to only one sex (e.g., the ability to
bear children) would be fully constitutional. On the other hand, if a particular
characteristic is found among members of both sexes, then the individual factor,
not the sex factor, would have to be determinative.
Third, the proscription the amendment contains applies only against gov-
ernmental action, or, in legal parlance, "state action." Private actions and
private or social relationships between men and women will not be affected by
the amendment. In determining the limits of the Equal Rights Amendments
scope, the courts will draw on the fourteenth amendment as interpreted in, for
example, the Civil Rights Cases.' The Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer?
stated the rule as follows:
[T]he action inhibited by the [Equal Protection Clause] of the Fourteenth
Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.
That Amendment erects no shield against merely private action or conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful.
6 Perhaps most authoritative are the recent Reports of the House and Senate judiciary
Committees on the Equal Rights Amendment: H. R. REP. No. 359, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971) (The separate views of Congressman Edwards and 13 other members on pp. 5-8
reflect the understanding of the proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment); S. REP. No. 689,
92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
7 109 U.S.3 (1883).
8 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
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The parameters of state action are neither fixed nor crystal clear,' but the
Supreme Court in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis' recently reaffirmed that there
are substantial limits on the scope of the fourteenth amendment. Similar prin-
ciples will apply under the Equal Rights Amendment.
Fourth, and finally, under established doctrine, the amendment will have
to be interpreted as part of the entire Constitution, and apparent conflicts, if
any, with other parts of the document will be harmonized by the courts." This
is particularly important with respect to the rights to privacy established in
Griswold v. Connecticut. As the House and Senate Committee Reports on the
Amendment both stated, "[T]his right [to privacy] would ... permit a separa-
tion of the sexes with respect to such places as public toilets, as well as sleeping
quarters of public institutions."'"
III. The Legal Situation
The American Bar Association Journal summarized quite well the two sides
of the argument over whether a constitutional amendment banning sex dis-
crimination was needed:
The legal debate on the equal rights amendment has revolved around
the question of whether the amendment is necessary. Opponents have
insisted that there is ample constitutional authority without the amendment
to secure equal rights for women....
But proponents of the amendment have pointed out that judicially con-
doned classifications based on sex still stand in many fields.' 4
It was primarily, though not entirely, the failure of the courts to apply the four-
teenth amendment to sex discrimination with the same vigor they had applied it
to racial discrimination that prompted Congress to approve the Equal Rights
Amendment."
A. The Legal History Before 1971
The first significant case involving sex discrimination was Bradwell v. The
State,'6 in which the Court upheld the refusal of the Supreme Court of Illinois
to allow women to practice law. Although the Court relied on the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment and not the equal protection or
due process clauses, the presumptions and attitudes which were to govern later
decisions sanctioning sex discrimination were already apparent:
9 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. R-v. 1065, 1071 (1969).
10 40 U.S.L.W. 4715 (June 13, 1972).
11 See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 900-02 (1971).
12 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13 S. REP. No. 689, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972), quoting H.R. REP. No. 359, 92nd
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971) (separate views).
14 58 A.B.A.J. 604-05 (June, 1972).
15 Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amend-
ment? 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1971).
16 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). See also In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1884).
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The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The consti-
tution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance,
as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which
properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood....
... The paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
17
Two years later, in Minor v. Happersett,28 the Court held that the fourteenth
amendment did not confer on women citizens the right to vote, a position which
stood until ratification of the suffrage amendment in 1920.
The test of "reasonableness" for determining the validity of sex discrimina-
tion under the fourteenth amendment was first expressly stated in the landmark
case of Muller v. Oregon 9 which upheld an Oregon maximum hour law for
women. It is ironic that Muller, which represented the most progressive thinking
of its time, has become the cornerstone of a judicial philosophy which upheld
almost all forms of discrimination against women as "reasonable," and therefore,
not in violation of the equal protection clause.
In Muller the Court was responding to the demonstrated need for legislative
protection of working conditions, a protection which has been subsequently
upheld for both men and women.2" Yet the assumptions about women on which
the Court based its decision in Muller have become firmly entrenched in judicial
doctrine. Finding that the apparent difference in physical endurance and
strength between men and women justified the state's restriction on the right
of women to work, the Court stated:
That woman's physical structure and performance of maternal functions
place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious.., as
healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being
of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve
the strength and vigor of the race. 2'
Using similar reasoning, the Court sustained other labor laws for women
in subsequent years as "reasonable" under the fourteenth amendment. In West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish22 a minimum wage law for women was upheld as a
reasonable exercise of the state's police power; in Radice v. New York,2  a law
prohibiting nighttime employment of women in restaurants was held not an
unreasonable or arbitrary classification; in Miller v. Wilson, 4 a women's eight-
hour labor law was held to be neither an arbitrary invasion of freedom of con-
tract nor unreasonably discriminatory.
Applying the standard of "reasonableness," the Court failed to find con-
stitutional fault with later labor laws which appeared to have little if any rational
17 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
18 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
19 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
20 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
21 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
22 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
23 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
24 236 U.S. 373 (1915).
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justification. For example, in Goesaert v. Cleary,2" the Court upheld a Michigan
statute prohibiting all females-other than the wives and daughters of male
licensees-from being licensed as bartenders. The Court reasoned that:
Bartending by women may, in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise
to moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive mea-
sures .... Since the line they have drawn is not without a basis in reason,
we cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real impulse behind the legisla-
tion was an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize the
calling.
2 6
The Court in Goesaert assumed that such patently discriminatory legisla-
tion could be sustained if it were "reasonably" related to the state's objective in
making such a classification. The Court did not even explore the possibility
that a more rigorous constitutional standard should be applied. It specifically
refused to consider whether the statute might reflect an "unchivalrous desire"
of males to monopolize the bartending trade. Moreover, the Court's concern for
protecting women from the noxious "moral and social" influences of the barroom
was plainly misplaced; Michigan permitted women to work in bars, prohibiting
them only from employment as bartenders. Furthermore, the statute itself
exempted the wives and daughters of bartenders from its supposed protection.
More recently, in Hoyt v. Florida,27 the Court upheld a Florida statute
providing that no female would be called for jury service unless she had registered
to be placed on the jury list. The Court found that such discrimination was
permissible under the fourteenth amendment, since it was reasonable
... for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude that a
woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service unless she her-
self determines that such service is consistent with her own special respon-
sibilities.
28
It is this predetermined, generalized conception of the nature and role of
women that underlies the Court's past decisions finding sex discrimination a
"reasonable" exercise of the state's police power. Women as a group have been
judicially viewed as being primarily limited to the home and family. Further,
they have been regarded as weaker in strength and endurance than men and as
less able to protect themselves against moral corruption and economic exploita-
tion. While this view may be accurate for some women, it might also be accurate
for some men. As a generalization, it is clearly inapplicable to the vast majority
of women in our society today.
B. The 1971 Supreme Court Term
When the Supreme Court decided to hear Reed v. Reed 9 and Alexander u.
25 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
26 Id. at 466-67.
27 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
28 Id. at 62.
29 Cert. granted, 400 U.S. 816 (1970) (No. 430).
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Louisiana,"0 there was great hope that a new view toward women's rights was
being ushered in. Reed involved a challenge to an Idaho statute which auto-
matically preferred males to females as between persons equally entitled to
administer an estate., Alexander was a challenge to a criminal conviction on the
ground, among others, that women were systematically excluded from the grand
jury list and venire and from the grand jury which returned the indictment. 2
It was, in short, an invitation to the Court to reverse Hoyt v. Florida."3
Those concerned about equal rights argued to the Court that it should aban-
don the approach it had previously taken in sex discrimination cases and, instead,
subject such discrimination to the most rigid scrutiny under the equal protection
clause."4 The Court has long recognized that when "fundamental" and "in-
dividual and personal" rights are involved, "strict scrutiny" must be exercised by
the courts lest such important rights be abridged or infringed. This standard of
review has been used by the Court to overturn discrimination in voting power,
discrimination against aliens, discrimination against the poor 5 and, most im-
portantly, racial discrimination.
Women clearly are entitled to equal protection of the laws under the four-
teenth amendment. Sex discrimination has as substantial an adverse impact on
our society as the other forms of discrimination which the Court has struck down.
Women have as great a claim to the benefits of the equal protection clause as
do aliens, indigents, and members of racial minorities. The same premises of
human dignity and fundamental equality that gave rise to the fourteenth amend-
ment require that its full protection be extended to strike down discrimination
on account of sex.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court declined to accept these arguments.
Alexander was disposed of on traditional race discrimination grounds, and the sex
discrimination point was not reached.3" Reed was, in some ways, even more dis-
appointing. The Court dealt specifically with the sex discrimination complaint
and did reverse the lower court's approval of the Idaho procedure." But the
Court did not overrule such cases as Goesaert and Hoyt, and it did not hold
that sex discrimination is "suspect" under the fourteenth amendment. Instead,
the Court left the burden on every woman plaintiff to prove that governmental
action perpetuating sex discrimination is "unreasonable." And that is a different
burden to carry, thus making it too difficult to expect any real assistance from
the courts in eliminating sex discrimination.
Reed was especially disappointing because so many (though by no means
all) lower courts had accepted the argument that state action which perpetuates
30 Cert. granted, 401 U.S. 936 (1971) (No. 5944).
31 See Idaho Laws, ch. 127 § 1 (1937) (repealed 1972).
32 See La. Grim. Pro. Code Ann., art. 402 (1967) '(selection of woman for jury duty pro-
hibited unless she files a written declaration of her desire to serve).
33 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
34 I had the privilege in this instance of representing the National Federation of Business
& Professional Women's Clubs, Inc., which filed an amicus curiae brief in Reed and Alex-
ander.
35 E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Takahashi v. Fish Comm'n, 334 U.S.
410 (1948).
36 40 U.S.L.W. 4365 (April 3, 1972).
37 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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sex discrimination is unconstitutional. Many of these decisions were based squarely
on the ground that sex discrimination must be reviewed under the strictest
fourteenth amendment standard and that seldom, if ever, can such discrimination
withstand careful judicial scrutiny.
Perhaps the most striking progress in eradicating sex discrimination had
been made in the area of occupational restrictions. In effect, the Court's decision
in Goesaert v. Cleary,3" was rejected by the Supreme Courts of New Jersey 9
and California,4" and by the Federal District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois.41 Each of these cases involved challenges to laws prohibiting women
from employment as bartenders-laws which were similar to the Michigan
statute sustained by the Court in Goesaert-and each held that the sex discrimi-
nation embodied in such occupational restrictions could not be sustained under
the fourteenth amendment.
There were numerous other examples of similar judicial decisions before
the Court when it decided Reed. For example, longer prison terms for women
than for men convicted of the same crime had been declared unconstitutional
under the fourteenth amendment in United States v. York.42 The court in York
had held that different sentencing laws for men and women constituted "invidious
discrimination" against women in violation of equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. In Commonwealth v. Daniel,4" the
court had declared that a statutory scheme fixing the maximum term of imprison-
ment for women but not for men convicted of the same crime created an arbitrary
and invidious discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Exclusion
of women from liquor-licensed public taverns had also been held to violate the
fourteenth amendment.4 4 In Mollere v. Southeastern Louisiana College45 a
federal court had held unconstitutional a requirement that unmarried women
under twenty-one live in the state college dormitory when no such requirement
was imposed on men. Further, the exclusion of women students from state-
supported "prestige" institutions had been held to violate the fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection guarantee.46 And a regulation requiring a female teacher
to leave her job in the fifth month of pregnancy had been held to violate her
right to equal protection. 7 Likewise, the exclusion of policewomen from the
examination required for promotion to sergeant solely because of sex had been
struck down as an impermissible denial of constitutional rights.4 An inheritance
tax imposed on certain property when devised by husband to wife, but not when
38 335 U.S. 464 '(1948), discussed supra note 25 and accompanying text.
39 Patterson Tavern & G.O.A. v. Borough of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 270 A.2d 628
(1970).
40 Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 3 CCH EMPLOY. PRAC. DEC. f 8222 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1971).
41 McCrimmon v. Daley, 2 FEP Cases 971 (N.D. 11. 1970).
42 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
43 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
44 Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
45 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969).
46 Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D.
Va. 1970).
47 Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, Civil No. 678-79-R (B.D. Va., May 17,
1971).
48 In re Shpritzer v. Lang, 234 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1962), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 744, 241 N.Y.
S.2d 869, 191 N.E.2d 919 (1963).
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devised by wife to husband, had been held to violate the equal protection guar-
antee.49 Finally, the statutory exclusion of women from jury service had been
held to violate the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause."0
The judicial trend apparent from even this small sample of cases was clear.
Courts across the country were beginning to recognize that laws or practices
which subject women to differential or inferior treatment because of their sex
are no more constitutionally permissible than other forms of invidious discrimina-
tion, particularly racial discrimination. But the Supreme Court chose not to
follow these lower courts. Its decision in Reed made it clear that the fourteenth
amendment would not be used to strike down sex discrimination as it had been
utilized to strike down racial discrimination despite the large body of scholarly
opinion that the equal protection clause should so apply. As the Association of
the Bar of New York City pointed out in a recent report endorsing the Equal
Right Amendment, "[t]he 1971 Reed case indicated no substantial change in
judicial attitude." Far from obviating the need for the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, Reed emphasized it.
0. Legislative Action
The fact that the Supreme Court has refused to apply the fourteenth
amendment with full vigor to sex discrimination is not necessarily conclusive evi-
dence that a constitutional amendment is needed. For it is theoretically possible
for Congress and each state to revise their laws and to eliminate those which dis-
criminate on the basis of sex. But that has always been true, and as this article
will indicate, there are still a vast number of state and federal laws which dis-
criminate on the basis of sex."' Thus reliance on ordinary legislative remedies
is misplaced in this situation.52
To be sure, some legislative progress has been made toward equal rights
for men and women. But it has, unfortunately, been sporadic and, on occasion,
inadequate. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex discrimi-
nation in employment unless sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification.""
Congress approved the Equal Pay Act which assures that many persons who do
equal work receive equal pay regardless of sex. 4 Just recently Congress passed
the Higher Education Bill which prohibits sex discrimination in colleges and
universities which receive federal funds.5 But too many of these and other federal
laws and regulations fail to reach a number of areas of sex discrimination, allow
for substantial exemptions, and have been implemented slowly or enforced lack-
adaisically. And, of course, Congress by mere legislation cannot reach sex dis-
49 In re Estate of Legatos, 1 Cal. App. 3d 657, 81 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1967).
50 White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 *(N.D. Ala. 1966).
51 See Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment, supra note 4; Freund, The Equal Rights
Amendment Is Not the Way, supra note 5.
52 See generally Dorsen & Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional Amendment, 6 HARV.
Civ. R GHTS-Civ. LrB. L. Rav. 216 (1971); Brown, et al., supra note 11, at 883-84.
53 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. '(1970).
54 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
55 P.L. 92-318, §§ 901-907 (June 23, 1972).
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crimination in state laws in areas traditionally and constitutionally committed
to the states.5"
In the states, progress has been mixed. Some states have made diligent
efforts to revise outmoded and discriminatory laws. At least three states--Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia-have recently approved state constitutional pro-
visions banning sex discrimination. However, in other states there has been no
progress at all.
Without the impetus of the Equal Rights Amendment, the real and rapid
progress we need against sex discrimination cannot be achieved. After ratifica-
tion of the Equal Rights Amendment, the states and the federal government
will have two years to revise any of their laws which are in conflict with the
Equal Rights Amendment. 7 This is adequate time for the necessary changes to
be made. After the two-year period has elapsed, state and federal laws which
violate the amendment will be subject to challenge in court, as will other forms
of "state action.""8 Thus the amendment guarantees the elimination of sex dis-
crimination. Ordinary legislative action, on the other hand, offers, at best, the
hope of equal rights in the far distant future.
IV. Sex Discrimination
The legal status of women is only one reason the Equal Rights Amendment
is needed. The other reason is that there is overwhelming evidence that persistent
patterns of sex discrimination actually do permeate our social, cultural and eco-
nomic life. Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm eloquently demonstrated the mag-
nitude of sex discrimination in our country when at hearings on the Equal
Rights Amendment she said: "I have been far oftener discriminated against
because I am a woman than because I am black."59
The evidence of sex discrimination is massive. Difficult as it is to believe,
women are sometimes denied even the basic rights and responsibilities of citizen-
ship in the United States. Although no state any longer excludes women from
juries altogether, there is still at least one state which requires women, but not
men, to register specially to be eligible to serve on juries." There is also invidious
discrimination against women in the criminal laws of some states. One state
has a statute which allows women to be jailed for three years for habitual
drunkenness, while a man can receive only thirty days for what amounts to the
same offense." In another state, the defense of "passion killing" is allowed to the
wronged husband but not to the deceived wife. 2 And in yet another state,
56 Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do, We Need a Constitutional Amend-
ment?, supra note 15 at 1516-19; see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); cf. Northern
Securities Co. v. United States. 193 U.S. 197, 402 '(1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
57 Section 3 of the Equal Rights Amendment provides: "This amendment shall take
effect two years after the date of ratification."
58 See discussion supra in notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
59 The "Equal Rights" Amendment, Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 Before the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate judiciary Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at
35 (1970).
60 The state is Louisiana; see Alexander v. Louisiana, 40 U.S.L.W. 4365 (April 3, 1972).
61 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-804, 48-943 (1964); see also State v. Costello, 59 N.J. 334,
282 A.2d 748 (1971); Wark v. State, 266 A.2d 62, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970).
62 Tax. PENAL CODE § 1220 (1961).
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female juvenile offenders can be declared "persons in need of supervision" for
noncriminal acts until they are eighteen, while males are covered by the statute
only until age sixteen."3
Governmental action also contributes significantly to sex discrimination in
education. Approximately seventy-five per cent of the college students in the
country attend publicly supported institutions. These colleges and universities
have a crucial role in determining employment opportunities for women by
providing access to professional training and careers. Yet widespread patterns
of sex discrimination are found in the admissions policies and hiring practices of
institutions of learning throughout the country. As an independent report pre-
pared for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare stated, "Discrimi-
nation against women, in contrast to that against minorities, is still overt and
socially acceptable within the academic community.""
Discrimination in admission to college is widespread. A much lower per-
centage of women between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one are enrolled in
college than of men of the same ages.6 While some of this difference results
from sex-role expectations, there are, as noted, solid indications of sex discrimi-
nation. In 1969, for example, one state university published an admissions
brochure which stated, "Admission of women on the freshman level will be
restricted to those who are especially qualified." 6  Another state university
admitted women only for summer school sessions, and never to the regular aca-
demic curriculum, unless they were related to employees or students and wished
to pursue a course of study otherwise unavailable." In 1970, the thirty-five
schools which were considered most selective by one college handbook admitted
approximately only twenty-nine per cent women to their freshman class as com-
pared to the national admissions rate of forty-one per cent."'
Discrimination against women does not end with admission; it pervades
every level of the teaching profession. While more than two thirds of the teachers
in public, elementary and secondary schools are women, only twenty-two per
cent of the elementary school principals and only four per cent of the high school
principals are women.6 At the college level, statistics show that almost half of
the male teachers become full professors while only ten per cent of the female
teachers are granted that status."0
The business and labor laws of some states discriminate invidiously against
women. Some states place special restrictions on the right of married women,
but not married men, to contract or to establish independent businesses or to
63 New York Family Court Act § 712 (b) (McKinney, 1954).
64 NEwMAN, REPORT ON HIGHER EDUCATION, 80 '(1971).
65 See 118 CONG. REc. 2746 '(daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Senator Bayh).
66 UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, PROFILE OF THE FRESHMAN CLASS (1969).
67 Texas A&M; see Brief for National Federation of Business & Professional Women's
Clubs, Inc., as amicus curiae, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Alexander v. Louisiana,
40 U.S.L.W. 4365 (April 3, 1972).
68 See 118 CONG. REc. S. 2747 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Senator Bayh)
'(ratings of colleges taken from CAss & BIRNBARUM, COMPARATIVE GuM TO AMERICAN CoL-
LEGES 1971).
69 Id. (quoting Dr. Peter Muirhead, Associate Commissioner of Education).
70 Id. at 49 (citing SrmoN & GRANT, DzGEST OF EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS (1969)).
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become a guarantor or a surety."' Perhaps even more astounding, in 1970,
twenty-six states had laws or regulations which prohibited the employment of
adult women in specified occupations or industries which were open to adult
men.
7 2
Most states have enacted so-called protective labor legislation in one form or
another. Many of these laws are not protective at all, but rather are restrictive,
and have been shown to have a discriminatory impact when applied only to
women. For example, a law which limits the working hours of women but not
of men makes it more difficult for qualified women to obtain work they desire.
It also inhibits the ability of qualified women to become supervisors. State laws
which limit the amount of weight a woman can lift or carry, arbitrarily keep all
women from certain desirable or high-paying jobs, although many if not most
women are fully capable of performing the tasks required. Speaking of such
restrictive laws as a whole, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
states in its guidelines on sex discrimination:
The Commission believes that [state laws which restrict or limit the em-
ployment or conditions of employment of females] although originally pro-
mulgated for the purpose of protecting females, have ceased to be relevant
to our technology or to the expanding role of the female worker in our
economy. The Commission has found that such laws and regulations do not
take into account the capacities, preferences and abilities of individual
females and tend to discriminate rather than protect.73
Partially because of these laws, as well as other sorts of sex discrimination,
working women are at a great disadvantage in the private sector. The median
salary income for women is only fifty-nine and one-half per cent of that earned
by men and in recent years the gap between male and female median incomes
has been widening.
7 4
Sex discrimination is clearly present even in government employment, which
in total accounts for more than twenty per cent of the labor force. For example,
although women constituted thirty-four per cent of all full-time white-collar
federal civil service employees in 1967, they filled more than sixty-two per cent
of the four lowest grades and only two and one-half per cent or less of the four
highest grades. 5 In addition, sex discrimination in government has a subtle
effect upon employment of women in the private sector, for private employers
often look to government as a model for employment practices.
V. Conclusion
For these reasons - the failure of the courts to apply the fourteenth amend-
71 See Freeman, The Legal Basis of the Sexual Caste System, VALPARAISO L. REv. 203,
212 (1971).
72 Hearings on S.f. Res. 61 Before the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., at 306 (1970) (statement of Professor Emerson).
73 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b) (2) (1972).
74 S. REP. No. 689, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972).
75 U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COmm'N, BUREAU OF MGT. SERVICES, STUDY OF EMPLOYMENT OF
WOMEN IN TiE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1967 17 (1968).
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THE NEED FOR THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
ment vigorously to sex discrimination, the practical difficulties in relying on
ordinary legislation to achieve equal rights quickly and uniformly, and the per-
vasiveness of sex discrimination in our country-the Equal Rights Amendment
is necessary. There is another point too: the symbolic effect of the Equal Rights
Amendment. The Constitution is our most fundamental document. We do not
and should not tamper with it for insignificant reasons.7" Therefore, an amend-
ment has great moral and persuasive value, and influences conduct beyond its
own legal reach. By declaring in the Constitution that men and women are
equal before the law, we will be giving the women of our country tangible evi-
dence of our commitment as a Nation to true equality. As was recently stated
by the American Bar Association Journal:
[W]e have confidence that our system will be able to prevent "legal chaos"
if the amendment is ratified. To act fifty years after an amendment was
required to give women the vote hardly seems to be rushing something
that should have been accomplished without another amendment but
wasn't.
77
The social and economic cost to our society, as well as the individual psy-
chological impact of sex discrimination, are immeasurable. That a majority of
our population should be subjected to the indignities and limitations of second-
class citizenship is a fundamental affront to personal human liberty. I am con-
fident that the states will respond as did Congress to the justified demands for
constitutional equality for men and women.
76 See C. PRrTozETT, THE AMEaNo CONSTITUTION 32 '(19591
77 58 A.B.A.J. 604, 605 (June, 1972).
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